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ABSTRACT
Well-intended tax policy often produces unintended consequences. In this
article, we look at one such tax policy, specialised surtaxes in the State of
Florida. Surtaxes are frequently adopted to provide financial assistance to
poverty-based local programmes and services. Despite the intended benefits,
we show that the contributors of the tax have been able to capitalise the cost
into the residential property market, ultimately placing the burden of the
surtax upon the population its revenue intends to help.
KEYWORDS Surtaxes; property costs; welfare programmes; tax policy
I. Introduction
A surtax is a tax levied either in addition to an existing tax or upon income
after it has exceeded a specified level (Garner 2004). At the federal level, the
United States has utilised surtaxes in a number ways, including to fund the
Vietnam War by the Johnson administration (Poterba 1988) and as a tool for
enforcing an income tax upon wealthy residents who would otherwise use
deductions to reduce their tax burden (Mikesell 2014). At the local level,
surtaxes are levied as a local option tax to fund particular services such as
transit systems, local government infrastructure, education and indigent
care programmes (Brunori 2007; Cherry 2012; Kim, Bae, and Eger 2009).
Although the establishment of a tax is generally viewed as undesirable,
the ability to target a surtax towards specific goods and populations and
then link the revenue to particular services allows for a high degree of
favourability amongst the population (Brunori 2007).
There is a rich literature on the effects of taxation on the behaviour of the
consumer and the market (Levine-Schayowitz 2005; Holcombe 2006; Stiglitz
1985), but what remains unclear is the relationship between a surtax and the
beneficiaries of the services the tax funds. A tax creates an economic
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inefficiency in the market between consumers and producers, resulting in a
decline of the total economic surplus (Jorgenson and Yun 1990). To counteract
this decline in surplus, the rational actor seeks ways to displace the cost of the
tax. Prior research, for example, has shown that local property and sales taxes
can be displaced by changes in rental fees within and between jurisdictions (Li
and James Brown 1980; Man and Bell 1996; Oates 1969; Palmon and Smith
1998). From an economic perspective, there is concern that the cost of a surtax
may be displaced towards those who the tax revenue intends to help. This
concern implies that any utility gained by the beneficiaries of a surtax-funded
programme may be reduced or lost as a result of a displaced tax.
The purpose of this article is to contribute to a better understanding of
the potential effects of surtaxes, paying particular attention to specialised
surtaxes in the State of Florida. Although surtaxes may have been adopted
to fund social welfare programmes across the state (Office of Economic and
Demographic Research 2012), we argue that the contributors of the tax have
been able to capitalise the cost into the residential property market.
Ultimately, the capitalisation places the burden of the surtax upon the
population its revenue intends to help. As we explore the potential effects
of surtaxes, we focus on two main tasks: first, we provide a framework
describing the capitalisation of a surtax into the residential property market.
Second, we estimate the effect of a surtax using data from the National
Survey of American Families (NSAF).
II. A theory of surtaxes
To establish a theoretical foundation for the effects of a surtax, we begin
with the extant literature on taxation. Traditionally, the impact of taxation
is viewed as a single, direct step, occurring between the consumer and
either the supplier or the taxing authority (Holcombe 2006). The public
budgeting and economic literatures agree that when a tax is imposed, a
deadweight loss to the economy ensues as a result of the distortion
between the price at which a consumer is willing to pay and the price
at which a supplier is willing to produce (Levine-Schayowitz 2005). This is
demonstrated by Figure 1, which shows a deadweight loss, ABC, when
tax C–B is imposed. Politically, a tax is designed to target either the
consumption of a good or its production; however, due to the nature
of the market, the burden of the tax will be distributed against all parties
(Hamilton 1976; Levine-Schayowitz 2005; Ramsey 1927). In the example
provided in Figure 1, the taxed party will actively seek to distribute the
burden of the tax onto others engaged in the market. Through redis-
tribution of the burden, the supplier will be responsible for portion d and
the consumer for portion e. The determining factor of a tax burden is the
elasticity of the market. The more elastic the consumers’ demand or the
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producers’ supply allows each to place the burden of the tax onto the
other party (Hamilton 1976).
Out of the traditional view has come a significant body of literature that
focuses on the impact of taxes on property values (Li and James Brown
1980; Oates 1969; Palmon and Smith 1998; Tiebout 1956; Yinger et al. 1988).
While much of this research has centred around the effect of property taxes,
Man and Bell (1996) have documented the effect of sales on the consumers’
budgetary decisions. When a tax is imposed, it reduces the desirability of the
property and forces property values to decrease as a compensation (Man
and Bell 1996; Man and Rosentraub 1998).
The traditional view provides insight into the effects of general forms of
taxation (e.g., sales, property and income taxes), but it only provides a small
piece of the surtax picture. A surtax is a specialised form of taxation. Since a
surtax is commonly implemented as a sales tax, it is subject to the same
direct effects as other, more general forms of taxation. That is, it produces a
change in the behaviour of the consumer and the supplier as they work to
distribute the tax burden. Where the effect of a surtax differs is in its indirect
effects. As an additional tax, the implementation and revenue use of a surtax
are carefully established (Kim, Bae, and Eger 2009). Levied funds have a
predetermined purpose, often one that is redistributive in nature, and the
tax burden is designed to target certain segments of the population.
Ultimately, the consumers burdened with the surtax may not be the
Figure 1. Supply and demand curve with a tax.
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beneficiaries of the public goods and services it funds. This creates a second,
indirect step within the tax relationship between the taxed consumers and
the beneficiary population.
To gain a more complete picture, we must consider the behaviour of the
consumer in the second step. When the consumer is the beneficiary of a
taxed exchange, his share of the tax burden becomes part of the cost of
engaging the market (Hamilton 1976). The targeted nature of a surtax,
however, suggests that the consumer faced with the tax is not the bene-
ficiary. In such a situation, the rational consumers will seek to minimise costs
by reapportioning their share of the tax burden onto others, creating a
secondary, but indirect, effect. We hypothesise that the consumers’ reap-
portionment occurs by capitalising the tax burden into the residential
property market.
Surtaxes may be capitalised into the residential property costs through
the market supply and demand forces. As a redistributive tax, surtaxes are
typically directed at consumers in higher income brackets, which is likely
to include the owners of investment rental properties. Furthermore, the
recipients of the programmes funded by the tax typically fall in the lower
income brackets and are most likely to be property renters. When a
rational acting owner of an investment property is subjected to a surtax,
he will actively work to reapportion the tax burden onto renters and
purchasers. Ease in reapportioning the surtax into housing costs can be
seen in the elasticity of the housing market. Traditional economic theory
says that the more inelastic the demand for a good becomes, the better
able for supplier to place a tax burden onto the consumer (Hamilton
1976; Levine-Schayowitz 2005). According to Topel and Rosen (1988), this
ability can be seen within the housing market as the demand for housing
demonstrates inelastic characteristics. That is, property owners are cap-
able of investing elsewhere, and the renter or purchaser must bear most
of the burden of the tax to continue engaging the property market. In the
instance of a surtax, the increase in tax burden is passed on in the form of
higher rental costs.
Ultimately, we hypothesise that the capitalisation of a surtax into housing
rental fees creates a distortionary effect on the beneficiaries of the pro-
grammes the tax funds. When surtaxes are earmarked for the provision of
welfare goods and services, surtaxes become causally linked to public goods
consumption. The very purpose of welfare programmes is to increase the
utility of low-income persons by providing goods and services that pro-
gramme beneficiaries would not otherwise purchase or by subsidising the
costs of goods and services they do purchase. While the surtax may be
levied on wealthier segments of the population, the ability to capitalise the
tax into the residential property market suggests that those within the
population the tax intends to help may also be subject to its costs. In
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such a situation, the redistributive goals of social welfare programmes are
attained only if the utility gained from the programme by the beneficiary is
greater than the utility lost as a result of the increased rental fees.
III. A model of surtax capitalisation
This section derives a model of surtax displacement. Our model builds upon
those of Brueckner (1979, 1982) and Man and Bell (1996) by accounting for
the displacement of a surtax through its capitalisation into the residential
property market. In the model, households within a governmental district
have identical preferences,1 whereby utility is derived from the consumption
of public goods, represented as G; housing services, represented as H; and
other non-housing goods and services, represented as N. It is further
assumed that the utility function is smooth and strictly concave. This is
represented as
U G;H;Nð Þ (1)
The budget constraint influences the behaviour of the household. Letting
Y denote the gross income of the household, R is the total rental payments
on a house. Further, P is the price per unit of non-housing goods such that
their consumption is taxed at rate (1 + τc), where τ indicates the presence of
a tax and the superscript c establishes the tax on consumption. As a
consumption tax can be imposed in several forms, we define τc as τc = τs
+ τt, where the superscripts represent the sales tax rate, s, and the surtax
rate, t. Although the price of housing is determined by local markets, the
price for non-housing goods is believed to be determined by the national
market and is therefore consistent across all households. This consistency
allows us to fix P at unity as a means of simplifying notation. The budget
constraint of the household is specified as
Y ¼ Rþ 1þ τcð ÞPN (2)
Given each household’s budget constraint and assuming that the price
of non-housing goods and services will not change in response to the tax,
the levy of a surtax must result in lower levels of consumption, decrease
in rental payments paid by the household or a displacement of the tax
elsewhere into the market. Here, we differ from the previous literature in
our assumptions. First, we make no assumption of a fixed rate of con-
sumption. Although Man and Bell (1996) argue that households are either
unwilling or unable to reduce consumption in the face of a higher tax,
this does not reflect observation. Engelhardt’s (1996) study of the con-
sumption patterns of households found that they reduce their consump-
tion to advance their living conditions. Second, we do not assume that
households move between tax jurisdictions in response to higher tax
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rates. The diffusion of policies across Florida counties suggests that
households who move would receive little to no benefit in terms of
reduced taxes (see McDonald and Gabrini 2014).2 With no benefit from
moving across governmental lines, a reduction in property cost is unlikely.
Instead, following the theoretical discussion from Section II, we argue that
when a surtax is levied, the rational acting household will seek to impose
the burden upon others. In this case, the burden is imposed through
increased rental property costs.
As the household adjusts its spending and preferences according to the
tax rate, an equilibrium utility level, U*, is obtained such that




The equilibrium utility level implicitly establishes the cost of property
as a function of the consumer’s consumption of housing services, public
goods and services, sales tax and surtaxes, and the income necessary to
reach equilibrium. Accordingly, the bid-rent function can be written as
R ¼ R G;H; τc; Yð Þ (4)
To further understand the influences upon rental costs and the prefer-
ences of the household for housing, we take the differentiation of the















¼ N < 0 (7)
where the partial derivatives of utility are denoted by the subscripts.
According to the differentiations, the cost of property is positively asso-
ciated with the level of public service provided and the housing services and
conditions. Equations (5) through (7) also show that a tax on consumption,
whether in the form of a sales tax or a surtax, can positively drive a change
in rental cost.
While the desirability of a property and the cost a household is willing to
pay are determined by Equation (4), the willingness of a property owner to
lease or sell his property is a function of the property’s value and the cost of
the imposed surtax. Given the interest of the property owner in reappor-
tioning a surtax, we establish property value as the discounted difference
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between the rental cost and the property tax and the cost of an imposed
surtax. Through simplification, this can be shown as
R ¼ V δþ τpð Þ þ τtPX (8)
where τp is the imposed property tax rate and δ is the discount rate. Solving
for the property value produces
V ¼ R G;H; τ
cð Þ
δþ τp þ τ
tPX (9)
Utilising the bid-rent model of the household and the drivers of property
value, we establish the following empirical model to test for the impact of
surtaxes on the residential property market:
Rij ¼ α0 þ β1τtij þ β2τPij þ β3Cij þ β4Sij þ ε (10)
where Rij is the monthly housing cost either in the form of rent or a
mortgage payment of the ith house in the jth city. τtij is the imposed surtax
and τpij is the effective property tax rate imposed on a house by the
governmental authority. Household characteristics are represented by Cij.
Sij is the governmental and neighbourhood characteristics of the respective
cities.
IV. Data sources and methodology
Data sources
To investigate the effect of a surtax on disadvantaged families and to
estimate our model, we use data from a number of sources and apply a
variety of statistical techniques. In this section, we discuss those data
sources and the measures adopted from them. An overview of the variables
and their sources is provided in Table 1.
Data in our analysis is restricted to households in Florida due to the
variation in the use of surtaxes by local governments throughout the state
and the availability of both household- and community-level data. We begin
by collecting data on all surtaxes imposed on sales for each sub-geographi-
cal area (SGA) in Florida. When imposed, state statute allows for surtaxes to
be levied on all tangible personal property with a value of $5000 or less
(Office of Economic and Demographic Research 2012). The imposed rate
ranges between 0.0% and 1.0% for both local government infrastructure
and charter county transit systems’ surtaxes and between 0.0% and 0.5% for
both indigent care and school capital surtaxes. Information on what surtaxes
are available to SGAs and their imposed rates are from the State of Florida’s
Office of Economic & Demographic Research (EDR) and are presented in
Table 2.
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To look at the effects of surtaxes on households within the SGAs, we
use the 2002 NSAF, Current Population Survey Family File, Social Family
File, Person File and the Household File as provided by the Urban
Institute. By merging the survey files, we were able to capture housing
expense and information about the household’s characteristics, including
whether the household owned or rented the property, the size of the
household and the property. To address the issue of poverty, we follow
the US Census Bureau’s concepts of poverty for 2002 as total family
income constructed from the number of individuals in each household.
The reference group is composed of households with total family income
above 200% of the 2002 federal poverty level. The second group is
termed low-income, which are households with total family income
between 101% and 200% of the 2002 federal poverty level. The last
group, poor households, is composed of households with total family
income at or below the 2002 federal poverty level. To construct the
total family indicator variable, we consider the federal poverty level for




Mortgage or rent Monthly rent or mortgage payment NSAF
Surtax indicators
Infrastructure Local government infrastructure surtax rate EDR
Transit system Charter county system surtax rate EDR
Indigent Indigent care surtax rate EDR
School capital School capital outlay surtax rate EDR
Poverty indicators
Poor Indicator if total family income is at or below 100% poverty level NSAF
Low-income Indicator if total family income is above 100% poverty level, but less
than 201% of poverty level
NSAF
Household characteristics
Renter Indicator of whether the house is owned or rented NSAF
Family income Log of total family income for 2001 NSAF
Number of
children
Number of children age 0–17 NSAF
Percentage
workers
Number of workers in your family/(HH size minus number of
children)
NSAF
HH size Number of individuals in household NSAF
Bedrooms Number of bedrooms in house NSAF
Public housing Indicator of whether the house is owned by a public housing
authority
NSAF
Public assistance Indicator of whether someone in the house received public
assistance, welfare payments, vouchers or emergency help from
the welfare office in 2001
NSAF
Locational characteristics
Income Income per capita in the SGA EDR
Expenditures Log of SGA expenditures EDR
Crime Crime rate in the SGA per 1000 population FLDE
Millage Millage rate per $1000 of property value EDR
Population Natural log of the SGA population EDR
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each of the 845 households based on the number of individuals in each
household.
The NSAF particularly focused on the SGAs in Florida. Currently, accessibility
to the data using a sub-state geography code to identify records by household
identification or social family identification (UFAMID) is restricted non-public
use data due to sensitivity regarding surveyed households and families. We
requested and received the sub-state geography code as a supplemental file
allowing us to allocate individual households or family units to their respective
SGA. This provides the opportunity to merge household-level data with data
on imposed surtaxes. The addition of the SGA identifier also provides the
opportunity to control for community influences on the rental property mar-
ket. Following the inclusion of locational characteristics in the rental price
model, household-level data was augmented with data on income,





Surtax levied at a rate between 0.5%
and 1.0% to fund infrastructure,
to acquire land for specified
purposes or to finance closures of
government-owned solid waste
landfills ordered by the
Department of Environmental
Protection. Selected counties have
broader spending authority.
Residents, but likely to benefit
low-income households







counties and counties within or
under inter-local agreements with
regional transit or transportation
authorities may levy this tax. The
tax may be levied at a rate from
0.0% to 1.0% to fund rapid transit
systems, bus systems, on-demand
transportation as well as roads
and bridges.
Residents and visitors, but most




This tax may be levied by counties
with populations of less than
800,000. The tax may be levied at
a rate not to exceed 1% if the
county has a publicly supported
medical school, otherwise the rate
is capped at 0.5%. Counties with
populations under 50,000 may
levy the tax at a rate not to
exceed 1%. The tax proceeds are
to fund health care services for
the medically poor.
Medically poor residents and
visitors of the county.
School capital outlay
surtax (School capital)
School districts may levy this tax at a




Residents with children in the
public school system.
Source: Office of Economic and Demographic Research (2012).
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population, millage rate and spending for each SGA from the EDR. Crime rates
were obtained from the Florida Department of Law Enforcement (FLDE).
The resulting data set provides a representative sample of 845 house-
holds in Florida that combines household survey responses with SGA-level
data. Combining this data set provides an unprecedented opportunity to
focus on the impact that surtaxes have upon mortgage/rent prices. To our
knowledge, this evaluative process of surtaxes through multiple data sets
has not been attempted. We believe that the NSAF data provides policy
makers and scholars the opportunity to closely look at the role surtaxes play
in mortgage/rent costs.
Methodology
We begin by creating a series of interaction variables, which allows us to
parse out the impact of a surtax on poor and low-income households. The
first sets of interactions are two-way interactions between each of the
surtaxes with the variables renter, represented as T, poor, represented as I,
and low-income, represented as W. The second sets are three-way interac-
tions between each of the surtaxes with the variables renter and poor. The
third and final sets of interactions are three-way interactions capturing the
association with renter and low-income. The resulting empirical model can
be shown as
Rij ¼ α0 þ β1τtij þ β11τtijTij þ β12τtijIij þ β13τtijWij þ β14τtijTijIij
þ β15τtijTijWij þ β2τPij þ β3Cij þ β4Sij þ ε (11)
The next set of steps relates to the estimation process itself. Given that
the data are cross-sectional in nature, we believe that a least squares
regression estimation process is appropriate. To address the issue of hetero-
scedasticity in our complex sample, we use jackknife repeated replication.3
To address the issue of multicollinearity due to the interaction terms, we
centre each interval input variable to have a mean of zero (Gelman 2008).
Next, we turn our attention to the correlations of the independent
variables in our model. We find that the SGA millage rate and income per
capita are highly correlated (r = 0.83) and SGA population and SGA expen-
ditures are highly correlated (r = 0.90). This directly affects the empirical
results of the model, in particular the variance inflation factors (VIF). To
reduce the variance inflation, we remove both SGA millage rate and SGA
population from the analysis. We then centre each interval variable to have
a mean of zero following the suggestions by Gelman (2008). Our results
show that the average VIF is 3.91 with a range of 1.10–8.43, which indicate
that the collinearity, given our interactions, is no longer an issue based on
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the common criteria for standardised data of a VIFi < 10 (Mason, Gunst, and
Hess 1989; Chatterjee and Price 1991; Kennedy 1992).
In the analysis, it is generally understood that the interaction terms must
be manually derived. This is due to the fact that software packages, includ-
ing STATA which was used in this analysis, derive the incorrect product
(interaction) since the software will centre the interaction term that is not
equal to the product, a point made very clear by Friedrich (1982). This fact
implies that the way to obtain correct results for standardised regression
with an interaction term involves computing the standardised terms, and
their product terms, manually. Then the regression can be conducted on the
standardised terms as with any other regression. Even though the correct
standardised coefficients are obtained using this manual method, the stan-
dard error still will not be correct for the standardised coefficients.
Standardised coefficients involve a stochastic scaling adjustment, which
itself is subject to sampling error. This adjustment is not made by most
statistics packages (see Bollen 1989, p. 125). In other words, computation of
standardised effects is correct if accomplished by using the manual proce-
dure, but the statistical significance needs to be assessed using unstandar-
dised coefficients. We adopt these adjustments for the methodological
issues regarding collinearity and heteroscedasticity.
V. Results and robustness checks
Results
To assist in describing the phenomena at hand, we begin the discussion of
our analysis with the descriptive statistics. These are presented in Tables 3
and 4. The data indicate that average mortgage/rent for our sample is about
$800 per month, while income is about $36,680 annually. Annually, mort-
gage or rent costs account for approximately 26% of a household’s income.
The average household is composed of four individuals including one child
17 years old or younger and three adults. The average household has two
adults currently employed. The average number of bedrooms for these
households is about three. These household characteristics are relatively
consistent with national averages (see U.S. Census Bureau 2013), confirming
the representative nature of our sample.
Within the SGAs, about 13% of households are classified as poor, with
income at or below the federal poverty line, and about 24% of household
are classified as low-income, with income between 101% and 200% of the
poverty line. Income per capita within the SGAs is almost $31,548. About 4%
of families in our study receive some form of public assistance, while 3% of
the households in the sample reside in public housing. Additionally, home
ownership is low, with 33% of households in the SGA renting homes or
180 R. J. EGER, III ET AL.
Table 3. Descriptive statistic of surtax variables.
Variable Average Median Q1 Q3
Surtaxes
Infrastructure 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure poor 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure low-income 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure renter 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure rRenter poor 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Infrastructure renter low-income 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit system 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit poor 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit renter 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit renter poor 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transit renter low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent poor 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent renter 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent renter poor 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Indigent renter low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital poor 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital renter 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital renter poor 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
School capital renter low-income 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of household and community variables.
Variable Average Median Q1 Q3
Dependent variable
Mortgage or rent 798.50 700 500 1,000
Poverty indicators
Poor 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00
Low-income 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
Household characteristics
Renter 0.33 0.00 0.00 1.00
Family income 10.51 10.65 10.09 11.14
Number of children 1.48 1.00 1.00 2.00
Percentage workers 0.66 0.67 0.50 1.00
HH size 3.56 4.00 3.00 4.00
Bedrooms 2.91 3.00 2.00 3.00
Public housing 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
Public assistance 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00
Renter poor 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Renter low-income 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00
Locational controls
Income 31,548 30,298 28,330 33,845
Expenditures 20.96 21.24 20.07 21.49
Crime 55.81 54.04 43.79 66.03
Millage rate 7.28 7.37 6.60 7.95
Population 13.59 13.75 13.11 13.87
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apartments. The average SGA exhibits a crime rate of approximately 56
crimes per 1000 people in the population. Looking at taxation, the average
property tax is about 7.28 mills per $1000 of value, while average govern-
ment spending in a SGA is about $1.3 billion. At least 10% of properties have
a minimum of a single surtax in their SGA.
To evaluate the empirical results of our regression analysis, we offer our
empirical estimates in Table 5. The analysis indicates differential impacts







Transit renter poor −30.26





Infrastructure renter poor −21.70





Indigent renter poor 22.67
Indigent renter low-income 99.97*
School capital 35.83
School capital renter −39.77
School capital poor 5.01
School capital low-income −38.06
School capital renter poor 27.72




















N = 845 Households; R2 = 0.50; Adjusted R2 = 0.48; F = 13.56.
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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based on the type of consumer and the surtax imposed. We begin by
looking at the direct effect of changes in SGA locational controls on monthly
mortgage or rent costs. The results show that an increase of $100,000 in SGA
expenditures will increase average mortgage or rent costs by about $57, a
result that is statistically significant. When looking at the income per capita
in the SGA, we find a statistical effect that indicates an increase in income
per capita will lead to a $34 increase in monthly mortgage or rent costs. Our
final locational control is crime, where we find that crime reduces monthly
mortgage or rent costs; however, this result is not statistically significant.
Taking a public choice approach, higher consumers of a publically pro-
vided good would realise higher costs. Our model proxies higher consumers
of public goods by variables for poor and low-income, but the results
indicate that only those classified as low-income realise a higher rental
cost as shown in Figure 2. As reported in Table 5 low-income renters realise
a statistically significant $121 increase in monthly rental costs.
Continuing our exploration of the empirical estimates, we report the
results surrounding our hypotheses that surtaxes are capitalised into the
costs of the residential property market. The coefficient on the surtax
associated with the charter county transit systems, represented as transit
system, is statistically zero. The absence of significance leads to the inference
that this surtax does not affect a household’s monthly mortgage or rent
costs. This finding also holds true for the interactions associated with the
transit surtax, which is contrary to our hypothesised relationship. Despite
the insignificance, the lack of effect with this surtax raises an important
point. We had hypothesised that surtaxes are capitalised into the residential
property market; however, we believe that the findings related to the transit

























Figure 2. Interaction between low-income and renter.
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traditional capitalisation process. The establishment or expansion of a transit
system increases the ease of transportation, which in turn increases the
accessibility of housing opportunities for poor and low-income families.
With more options available to consumers, property owners must then
establish selling and rental prices that are competitive with other locations.
The coefficient on the surtax associated with local government infrastruc-
ture, represented as infrastructure, is negative. Specifically, the infrastructure
surtax reduces housing costs by about $34; however, the result is not
statistically significant. When we consider the effect of the surtax on renters,
however, we see a reversal of the outcome. The results show that house-
holds who rent in an SGA with the infrastructure surtax have an expectation
of an increase in their rental costs of about $57 per month. The finding is an
indicator that property owners pass the surtax costs to renters. Our outcome
is similar to the argument provided by Mieszkowski (1972), whose derivation
of the property tax showed that some of the tax incidence is applicable to
the housing consumer and the owner of the capital asset. Figure 3 provides
a graphical presentation of the infrastructure surtax effect for both renters
and mortgage holders. As shown, renters have lower monthly rental costs
than property owners in SGAs without the infrastructure tax, but this result
reverses when the tax is present in the SGA.
Indirectly, we find evidence that renters may have a higher consumption
rate of public goods funded by the infrastructure surtax. This evidence is in
the form of an increase in rental costs. It can be argued that this indicates
the presence of the benefits view with the infrastructure surtax; however,
this surtax is specifically limited to long-lived infrastructure assets and
improvements, which includes land acquisition based on Florida Statutes

























Figure 3. Interaction between infrastructure surtax and renter.
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provides additional benefits through long-lived public asset improvement to
property owners. The use of the infrastructure surtax findings supports the
Man and Bell (1996) finding that capitalisation can occur with a sales tax.
Our findings provide support for this literature by showing that capitalisa-
tion of infrastructure improvements via a sales tax into housing values may
also be passed along to renters in the form of increased rental costs in SGAs
with improved public infrastructure.
Figure 4 provides the interaction of infrastructure surtax, renter/mort-
gagee and income classifications. Line (1) indicates a large change for rental
households that are low-income when they reside in a SGA with the infra-
structure surtax. Following the work of Dawson and Richter (2006) on
interaction terms, we find that the decrease in average rental costs is $117
per month for rental households who are low-income in an SGA with the
infrastructure surtax. We statistically test the slope differences among the
four households depicted in Figure 4 finding that the low-income house-
holds that rent, indicated as (1) on the figure have statistically lower rent
than not low-income households that rent, indicated as (3) on the figure.
Looking at low-income renters and not low-income mortgage holders,
indicated as (4) in the figure, we find that low-income renters have margin-
ally higher monthly rental costs than not low-income mortgage holders
although this result is only statistically significant at the 0.11 level. We
note that households identified as not low-income that are mortgage
holders have significantly lower monthly costs than either low-income
mortgage holders, indicated as (2) on the figure, or not low-income renters.



























(1) Low-Income,  Renter
(2) Low-Income, Not Renter
(3) Not Low-Income, Renter
(4) Not Low-Income, Not Renter
Figure 4. Interaction between infrastructure surtax, renter and low-income.
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Using the same methodology as presented in Figure 4 and Table 6, we
look at the statistical evidence of a marginal effect for the indigent surtax, a
tax that is established to fund a broad range of health care services for both
indigent persons and the medically poor. We find, as represented in Figure 5
and statistically analysed in Table 7, that low-income renters in an SGA with
the indigent surtax pay a significantly higher monthly rental costs than low-
income mortgage holders in that SGA. Looking at the two indicators for
Table 6. One tail t-test of slopes for infrastructure surtax three-
way interactions.
Pair of slopes t-Value for slope difference p-Value for slope difference
(1) and (2) −1.426 0.154
(1) and (3) −2.520 0.012
(1) and (4) 1.618 0.106
(2) and (3) −0.513 0.608
(2) and (4) 1.809 0.071


























(1) Low-Income,  Renter
(2) Low-Income, Not Renter
(3) Not Low-Income, Renter
(4) Not Low-Income, Not Renter
Figure 5. Interaction between indigent surtax, renter and low-income.
Table 7. One tail t-test of slopes for indigent surtax three-way
interactions.
Pair of slopes t-Value for slope difference p-Value for slope difference
(1) and (2) 1.961 0.050
(1) and (3) 1.567 0.117
(1) and (4) −1.092 0.275
(2) and (3) 0.026 0.979
(2) and (4) −1.689 0.092
(3) and (4) −1.470 0.142
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mortgage holders, indicated as (2) and (4) in Figure 5, we see that low-
income mortgage holders pay significantly lower monthly costs when com-
pared to not low-income mortgage holders.
The final surtax, school capital surtax, provides funding for the construc-
tion or remodelling of public schools. Our findings show that the use of this
surtax has no statistical effect on mortgage or rent costs. Similar to the
transit surtax, we find no effect when using income classifications.
Following the model previously established, we controlled for alternative
impacts on mortgage or rent costs at the household level. These controls
included the characteristics of households and government programme
effects. Our controls provide similar results found in the prior literature on
property taxation and capitalisation. We find that family income increases
average mortgage/rent costs, while recipients of public assistance see a reduc-
tion in mortgage/rent costs. The number of children in a household is found to
increase the household’s mortgage or rent costs, whereas the total size of the
household appears to reduce mortgage or rent costs. We believe that these
effects reflect the needs of the household: children increase the need for space
and rooms, whereas adults are more likely to share or cohabitate. We also find
that our measure of the housing unit itself, the number of bedrooms, indicates
that an increase in the number of bedrooms increases mortgage or rent costs.
This relationship demonstrates the size effect of property valuation, which,
thereby, affects the rental/mortgage costs. Support for the impact of income
on residential property costs can be seen in the measure of public housing
within SGAs. The results of the regression analysis show that the presence of
public housing within an SGA reduces average monthly costs. Our results for
the household controls are consistent with the prior literature indicating the
reliability of the model derived for this study and the effects of surtaxes found.
Robustness checks
To assess changes in the model independent variables with the outcomes
presented in Table 5, we offer two models that remove one independent
variable associated with each of the controls, one for household characteristics
and the other for locational controls. We offer these results in Table 8. Our
findings are that our independent variables of interest, surtaxes, are virtually
unaffected by the change in specification of the model. We conclude that our
results are robust to changes in the percentage of workers in the household
and the crime rate within the SGA.
VI. Conclusion
The primary issue considered in this research is the use of surtaxes to fund
public goods-oriented programmes. Surtaxes are frequently viewed positively
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due to the ability to tailor the tax around certain activities and to restrict
generated revenues to specific programmes. We certainly support the idea
that a tailorable tax is preferred over a generically applied tax policy for specific
public programmes; however, we have challenged their use to fund
Table 8. Robustness check.
Coefficient
Variable w/o Percentage workers w/o Crime
Surtaxes
Transit system −31.91 −33.03
Transit renter 2.65 7.40
Transit poor −36.98 −34.15
Transit low-income −5.60 −4.20
Transit renter poor −24.30 −30.12
Transit renter low-income 23.97 18.24
Infrastructure −34.36 −33.73
Infrastructure renter 59.60* 57.39*
Infrastructure poor 15.91 12.53
Infrastructure low-income 41.03 37.65
Infrastructure renter poor −26.21 −21.67
Infrastructure renter low-income −127.56** −117.87**
Indigent −14.57 −16.01
Indigent renter −37.86 −33.57
Indigent poor −53.17 −51.67
Indigent low-income −32.13 −32.43
Indigent renter poor 26.69 22.80
Indigent renter low-income 101.10* 99.99*
School capital 35.60 34.89
School capital renter −40.54 −39.74
School capital poor 7.57 4.95
School capital low-income −40.20 −37.93
School capital renter poor 23.46 27.88






Family income 294.71*** 296.37***
Number of children 82.64** 80.29**
Percentage workers −21.63
HH size −94.25*** −87.48***
Bedrooms 150.18*** 149.53***
Public housing −159.96*** −165.37***
Public assistance −188.32*** −188.05***
Renter poor 40.26 42.24







Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48
F-statistic 13.66*** 13.94***
N 845 845
*p < 0.10; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01.
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programmes that would benefit disadvantaged families. Economic theory
suggests that taxed populations actively seek ways of dispersing the tax onto
other parties. In the case of surtaxes, those who are taxed are also most likely to
own rental property, which provides an avenue of displacement of the inci-
dence of tax as disadvantaged families are most likely to be renters. This
provides the opportunity for the effective incidence of the surtax to be placed
upon those for whom the tax revenue is intended to help.
Based on the analysis, we find that two of our surtaxes statistically influence
the residential property market and the cost of housing for disadvantaged
families. Statistical influence comes from surtaxes directed for infrastructure
and indigent health care. Supporting the displacement hypothesis, we find that
when the infrastructure surtax is imposed, the property cost of the general
population is decreased. The outcome for the general population may be
represented by the type of surtax: since it is a long-term capital improvement
programme, the infrastructure surtax reduces property value. When looking at
the type of possessor of the housing stock, that is, renter versus mortgage
holder, we find that the infrastructure surtax harms renters through increases in
rental costs. With regard to income levels for households who rent, the cost of
housing for low-income families is decreased with the infrastructure surtax.
When we look at the indigent surtax, we find that with regard to income levels
for households who rent, the cost of housing for low-income families is
increased with the indigent surtax. This raises a serious issue in the intended
results of the tax policy known as surtaxes and the implication to those whom
are financially disadvantaged: the responsibility to fund social programmes
intended for disadvantaged families is falling upon their own shoulders.
If surtaxes are to be used as a funding tool for welfare-enhancing pro-
grammes, then the method of taxation and the opportunity to displace that
tax must be a part of the conversation. In many ways, the diversity in types of
surtaxes that will increase the housing costs of poor or low-income households is
problematic, because it demonstrates the breadth of ways that the disadvan-
taged can be unintentionally hindered. As to whether such surtaxes can bemore
targeted in their application, additional researchmust be conducted. Until such a
time as this research is conducted and effective policy solutions are established,
one solution would be to consider removing the specialised tax and building the
revenue collection into existing tax structures. For this recommendation we look
at the research conducted by Man and Bell (1996). Although their work did not
consider the impact of surtaxes, they did provide an understanding of the impact
of sales tax on property costs. While we have shown that surtaxes can be
displaced onto renters, Man and Bell (1996) showed that a generalised sales
tax cannot be similarly displaced as it remains with the consumer. We acknowl-
edge that disadvantaged families would also be impacted by the expansion of a
generalised sales tax, but it is possible that the negative impact from the sales tax
would be less than the impact of the surtax on property costs.
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The findings of this study are interesting and they do provide much to
consider, but they are also not without their limitations. The sample utilised
involved only households in the State of Florida; however, other states may
have different experiences. The characteristics of a community can influence
how the population engages its government and interacts with those around
them (McDonald and Gabrini 2014). This suggests that the experience of surtax
displacement may differ across state lines. Furthermore, the types of surtaxes
utilised can vary significantly. For example, the State of Indiana does not allow an
infrastructure or transit system surtax, but it does allow a wheel surtax and a
motor vehicle surtax (DeBoer 1990). Both of these taxes are applied across the
board, leaving little room for the cost to bedisplacedontoothers in the respective
communities. Given this variation in implementation, any proposed surtax should
be studied for displacement opportunities prior to implementation.
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Notes
1. The assumption of households having identical preferences is based on the work of
Brueckner (1979). Brueckner argued that the bid-rent nature of the housing market
provided an opportunity for the rental price of housing to adjust to ensure that the
utility of identical consumers was equal, regardless of which house they chose to
rent. Rent costs on overpriced houseswould be bid down, and under-priced houses
would be bid up until individuals are indifferent to the house they rent.
2. The Tiebout hypothesis suggests that households will relocate to a jurisdiction
where the set of goods, services and taxes matches their preferences (Tiebout
1956). A number of studies have shown the diffusion of government policies
at the county level, including two that deal specifically with Florida (see Kim,
Bae, and Eger 2009; McDonald and Gabrini 2014), have virtually no effect on
household relocation. These studies suggest that households who move might
receive a temporary benefit from reduced taxation, but the new jurisdiction is
likely to adopt a tax similar to those of the household’s previous residence.
3. Given the complex sampling schemes in the NSAF data, including stratifica-
tion, varying sampling weights and unequal-probability sampling designs, we
use the robust and non-bias features of jackknife standard errors, which use
repeated replications. The theoretical aspects of the jackknife can be found in
Wu (1986), and a basic introduction is accounted for in Wolter (2007). As a
robustness check, we use the traditional Huber/White/sandwich estimator of
variance with similar statistical results. The results using the jackknife provide
larger standard errors, an outcome that provides a conservative statistical
estimate, thereby reducing Type I error.
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